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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the creation of private regulation of agricultural 
production, processing, trade and retail sale of food in the global economy and 
discusses their implications. In this endeavor, it points to the power to govern and 
the authority to govern as the two crucial conditions for the emergence and 
diffusion of private food regulation. Cutler, Haufler and Porter1 define authority 
as “decision-making power over an issue area that is generally regarded as 
legitimate by participants.” Accordingly, we consider legitimacy a constitutive 
element of private authority in food governance, next to the enabling role of the 
structural power of agrifood corporations, which allowed the imposition of their 
rules on others. Indeed, scholars observe that non-state actors, specifically big 
retail corporations, have increasingly come to be perceived as legitimate political 
actors in global food politics, particularly in the context of the creation and 
implementation of private norms, rules and standards.2 
Global food and agriculture governance faces tremendous challenges at 
the dawn of the new millennium. Food insecurity, i.e., the inability to access 
sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food, remains a core concern for 
hundreds of millions of people while hunger and poverty are expanding at 
alarming rates on a global scale. Soaring food prices and the global economic 
downturn put additional pressure on already vulnerable populations and marginal 
groups. At the same time, global environmental challenges, in particular climate 
change, as well as pollution and water shortages, are expected to multiply threats 
to the provision of adequate amounts of nutritious and safe food. Moreover, 
environmental problems are exacerbated by a complex array of factors, including 
resource intensive dietetic shifts in some emerging economies, notably China, less 
availability of land due to biofuel plantations, loss of agricultural productivity due 
to soil degradation, and increasing competition for the use of natural resources. 
Accordingly, we focus on the sustainability of the global agrifood system, 
especially environmental conditions and food security, in our analyses of the 
consequences of private food governance. 
This paper proceeds in two steps. In the first part of the paper, we discuss 
the manifestations of private regulation in food retailing and their consequences 
for the sustainability challenges identified above. We review and add to previous 
research showing that the rise of food retail governance has serious consequences 
for two fundamental attributes of global food governance, namely environmental 
sustainability and food security. Clearly, the environmental impacts of food 
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supply chains are numerous and cover all stages from the production of raw 
materials to processing, distribution and sale. Yet, environmental norms, for 
instance, tend to play a marginal role in private retail governance and address a 
few select issues only. Retail governance also affects food security, and, it has had 
a limited positive impact on food safety. Thus, it has resulted in improved choice 
for some consumers, as we show below. These benefits, however, tend to accrue 
only to a small segment of the global population. Simultaneously, retailers also 
restructure local markets and social networks, particularly in the South, imposing 
major difficulties on small farmers, and amplifying their food insecurity. 
In the second part of the paper, we discuss the causes and facilitating 
conditions of the emergence of private regulation in global food retailing. 
Specifically, the paper highlights the role of material and ideational structures in 
enabling and constraining actors and their access to legitimacy sources. The paper 
argues that the structural power of agrifood corporations and the supportive 
setting of public policies that fostered trade liberalization and capital mobility 
enabled the development and exercise of private regulation. Moreover, we 
delineate the ways in which neoliberalism and globalization discourses as well as 
access to and control over financial and technological networks facilitated the 
attribution of political legitimacy to these economic actors on the basis of 
expertise, a focus on efficiency values, trust in technology, and the notion of 
appropriate delegation.3 Furthermore, the paper points out how food retail 
corporations are strategically shaping and strengthening their perceived 
legitimacy as political actors by re-making images and identities, using and 
framing discourses and instrumentalizing public authority.4 
With its analysis, the paper aims to contribute to the theoretical and 
empirical debate on private authority, private regulation and the challenges for 
sustainability in the global food system. Empirically, the paper makes a timely 
contribution particularly due to widespread concerns about food safety, 
availability of food supply and, increasingly, the environmental well-being of the 
food system. Likewise, private food retail standards present an excellent example 
of private authority as these de jure voluntary private standards have become de 
facto compulsory,5 as actors who fail to comply lose their “license” to participate 
in the global market.6 Given that non-elected actors thus design and enforce quasi 
compulsory rules and norms, the foundations of their authority deserve attention. 
The paper also contributes to critical analyses of private authority by explaining 
the mechanisms of private authority creation on the basis of power structures. The 
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concluding section therefore delineates the implications of our findings for 
politics and social science. 
2. Manifestations and Consequences of Private Regulation on Global Food 
Governance 
 
This section presents the manifestations of private retail regulation and its 
consequences for two major challenges facing the global food system today, 
namely environmental well-being and food security. Traditionally the concern of 
governments and international organizations, these two aspects of sustainability 
now represent a flourishing terrain for retail corporations’ governance activities, 
particularly in the form of private standards and corporate social responsibility 
initiatives. On the basis of such standards and initiatives, retailers are able to 
regulate the human impact on the food system in general, and environmental well-
being and food security in particular. The analysis that follows serves two goals. 
First, we need to know whether private initiative is fostering improvements in the 
sustainability of the food system or worsening an already bad situation. Second, 
such an analysis provides the impetus for inquiring about the rise of retail 
authority, the subject of the next section. 
2.1 Environmental Well-being 
 
All stages of the human food supply chains, from food production to processing, 
packaging, distribution and sale, leave an impact on the environment. Waste, 
water pollution, energy inefficiencies, pesticide use and the decline of biodiversity 
constitute typical environmental concerns associated with food chain processes. 
Crucially, the governance of environmentally harmful side-effects of food 
production is a rapidly emerging issue for retailers.7 Retail governance of these 
environmental issues takes place in three distinct ways: prescription and/or 
adoption of (a) good agricultural practices and/or promotion of organic products, 
(b) specific “good manufacturing” practices, and (c) general energy efficiency 
initiatives. Examples of such governance schemes and their impacts on the well-
being of the food system are discussed below. 
Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) are standards prescribing farming 
practices that aim to concretely contribute to environmental, economic and social 
sustainability of on-farm production, resulting in safe and healthy food and non-
food agricultural products.8 Retailers' environmental standards concerning GAP 
practices require, for instance, the sparing use of water, pesticide use and 
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antibiotics, or prescribe energy conservation as well as wildlife and landscape 
conservation and enhancement. Retailers develop such standards either 
individually or collectively. Examples of prominent environmental GAP 
standards developed by individual retailers include Tesco’s Nature’s Choice 
Scheme and Carrefour’s Quality Line Products. At the global level, the Global 
Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGap), a private sector body that 
sets voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products around the 
globe, is the chief example of collective GAP standards.9 
Retail chains are also entering organic retailing. Organic production 
standards are more stringent than GAP standards and include the forbiddance of 
conventional pesticides, artificial fertilizers, GMOs, ionizing radiation and food 
additives, or antibiotics and growth hormones for animals. Beyond these 
requirements for organic products, retailers often demand that suppliers meet 
additional stipulations, in particular concerning size and color. Organic fruits and 
vegetables, for instance, ought to resemble conventional products as much as 
possible.10 Currently, most organic sales in the EU and abroad are made through 
conventional retailers.11  
Beyond the agricultural sector, some retail standards also focus on the 
environmental impact of manufacturing processes and packaging; they are part of 
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP).12 These practices include, for example, 
recycling programs for waste reduction in packaging. Many supermarkets have 
recycling programs in situ, where consumers can return plastic bottles, glass, 
cans, paper packages, small electronic equipment, mobile phones and batteries. 
Some supermarkets implement environmental management systems to minimize 
waste and perform life-cycle analyses to define their policies on check-out bags 
and advertising catalogues (e.g., Carrefour). Moreover, many supermarkets 
operate under ISO 14000-series standards. 
Finally, given the increasing attention to concerns about climate change at 
the global and (certain) national levels, some leading retailers have started to 
adopt energy efficiency initiatives. Similar to GAP practices, some of these 
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initiatives are developed by individual retailers, whereas others constitute 
collective efforts. Examples of individual initiatives include global retail leaders’ 
initiatives, such as Wal-Mart’s sustainability index label, which communicates the 
CO2 emissions as well as other environmental consequences (e.g., water usage 
and air pollution) of various products sold at Wal-Mart, starting October 2009. 
Top European retailers, such as Carrefour and Tesco, have also adopted CO2 
reporting schemes. Instead of focusing on some individual products, however, 
their reports cover their entire operations. 
Collective initiatives to regulate energy efficiency can be found at the EU 
level. Specifically, EuroCommerce and the European Retail Round Table (a 
consortium of retailers with a customer base of 250 million people), which 
represent the European retail sector, pledged to improve energy efficiency by 20 
percent by 2020 (compared to 2004 levels).13 In that context, a Retail Forum and a 
Retailers’ Environmental Action Plan (REAP) were launched, setting voluntary 
targets to reduce energy consumption of the retailers themselves as well as the 
ecological footprint of their supply chains.14 
What is the impact of such initiatives? Even though the environmental 
auditing of retail operations is currently incomplete and covers only specific 
products or practices rather than the sector as a whole,15 some conclusions can be 
drawn. Specifically, individual best practice projects concern only a small part of 
total production and thus their impact on the overall environmental characteristics 
of the global food system is minimal.16 Tesco’s Nature Choice scheme, for 
instance, covers about 12,000 out of the 300,000 suppliers that exist in the UK. 
GlobalGap, which is currently implemented in more than 100 countries and 
covers 94,000 suppliers worldwide with growing membership every year, has a 
larger potential impact. In that case, however, many environmental conservation 
practices are only recommendations, and supplier non-compliance does not 
always prevent certification.17 The potential of GlobalGap is further weakened by 
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the declining emphasis on sustainability within the GlobalGap initiative from its 
launch in 1997 until today.18 
Endorsement of organic standards by retailers has increased the 
availability of organic food for many consumers and has increased market and 
financial security for some organic producers.19 The net environmental benefits of 
organizing organic production under global supply chains have yet to be 
established, however. Such practices also foster the weakening of the organic 
movement’s second-order principles, such as sourcing from local networks and 
privileging small suppliers. The latter are especially vulnerable, as the retailer's 
additional requirements for color and size of organic products can mostly be 
afforded by big producers. 
Regarding the energy efficiency initiatives, it is too early to evaluate their 
impact. Collective pledges by European retailers to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions have real potential since retailers are the main drivers of energy 
inefficiency in the EU food sector, though the target may not be sufficiently 
ambitious to achieve meaningful GHG reductions.20 Moreover, compliance with 
these standards is expected to be high, not least due to the supervisory role 
adopted by the Commission and its “threat” to introduce its own stringent 
standards. Compliance is another matter for individual (non-EU) initiatives. Thus, 
reporting in Wal-Mart’s sustainability index is voluntary and non-compliance 
does not carry any consequences for the suppliers.21 Likewise, critical analyses 
have suggested that the ISO 14000-series standards lack stringency (i.e. they do 
not set clear, measurable and ambitious targets) and limit the requirements to 
measuring and reporting, so that little improvement in actual conduct should be 
expected from them.22 
In general, the question remains whether retail environmental standards 
are stringent and comprehensive enough to allow the reaping of significant 
environmental benefits. At the moment, the evidence is inconclusive. We 
therefore caution against too easily attributing effectiveness to private 
environmental regulation by retailers.23 
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2.2 Food Security 
 
According to the Rome Declaration on World Food Security, food security exists 
“when all people, at all times, have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to 
meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”24 
Today, food insecurity remains a problem for millions of people while its range 
and consequences have been aggravated by the recent food crisis. FAO estimates 
that world hunger is increasing, with the number of hungry people reaching more 
than one billion in 2009.25 Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific had the 
largest increases in the number of undernourished people in the last years, while 
poor, landless and female-headed households were particularly affected.26 
Food insecurity has also increased in the western world, however. In the 
US, hunger has been a persistent cause of concern for decades. In the 1990s, it 
was estimated that 11 million people lived in households that were “food 
insecure” and a further 23 million lived in risk of hunger.27 Likewise, food 
insecurity is also observed in the EU. According to the European Nutrition for 
Health Alliance (ENHA), more than 50 million Europeans, particularly low 
income populations and the elderly, are malnourished.28 
How do retailers' private standards affect food security, and which 
dimensions of food security do they influence? The development of own-brand 
products and investments in auditing techniques for different aspects of food 
quality29 have had a positive impact on several aspects of food security at first 
sight. Thus, many products have become cheaper, while diversity has increased, 
allowing more people to satisfy a variety of preferences. Organic food, fair trade, 
kosher30 (religious), food for diabetics (health concerns), functional foods and 
beverages exist in abundance on supermarket shelves. 
Moreover, attention to food safety risks, particularly from microbiological 
hazards, has improved via the establishment of traceability schemes and food 
safety standards (e.g., HACCP),31 even though larger epidemic outbreaks have not 
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always been managed well. Prominent retail standards with a major focus on food 
safety include the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), British Retail Consortium 
Global Standard for Food Safety (BRC), International Food Standards (IFS), Safe 
Quality Food (SQF) and GlobalGap.32 
Critics point out, however, that only affluent consumers have significant 
food choice, while middle-income consumers have rather less and the poor next to 
none.33 In this vein, the benefits of the private regulations discussed above accrue 
to a small segment of the global population, particularly consumers in the 
Western world and the emerging consumer class of fast-developing countries, in 
particular China.34 As we explain in more detail in the next section, this is a 
crucial observation as retail authority largely depends on such selected “elite” 
groups. 
Finally, large retail chains also impact food security in indirect ways. 
Many observers view especially the proliferation of private certification schemes 
(including those identified in the previous section), as pushing small farmers out 
of the market in favor of large agribusinesses and food processors due to the high 
costs of implementation.35 According to critical observers, thousands of farmers 
in Africa, for instance, have lost their “license to produce” as a result of 
GlobalGap certifications.36 While pressure on rural incomes in developing 
countries already existed because of asymmetric trade liberalization,37 the 
negative impact has been reinforced by the spread of private food retail 
standards.38 Here, too, poor, landless and female-headed households are the 
hardest hit.39 
These developments contribute to the ongoing rural exodus, which is 
already a strong trend in countries with long-term economic maldevelopment.40 
Rural dwellers currently represent 60 per cent of the population of developing 
countries. That share is expected to drop to 44 per cent by 2030 with profound 
social, economic and environmental repercussions.41 While it would be an 
exaggeration to claim that the demands put on developing countries' farmers by 
global food retailers are the only cause, they are an important additional driver.  
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 For an extended analysis of these standards see Fuchs et al 2011. 
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Migration to nearby medium and large cities does not necessarily signal a 
country’s economic development and improvements in living standards. Rather, 
the fastest-growing parts of large cities are often their slums.42 The already 
vulnerable members of the population then, become even more vulnerable, when 
they are forced to migrate to an urban environment due to shrinking opportunities 
to earn a living as small farmers.43 
 
To sum up, retailers have an impact on the environmental consequences of 
the food system and on food security via the development of private standards and 
initiatives. The global net benefit, however, is at best ambiguous at the moment. 
Evidence of broad-based environmental improvements as a result of retail 
governance is currently lacking, while examples of best practices are too few at 
present and have too little coverage to be confident that private regulation makes 
a difference. The impact of private regulation on food security is even more 
problematic. While some benefits in terms of food safety and diversity can be 
observed, these accrue disproportionately to a small segment of the global 
population. In contrast, the majority of the global poor (also representing the 
majority of global population) gain little—and many may lose—from retail 
authority in global food governance. 
3. The Causes of Private Regulation in Global Food Governance 
 
The previous section established the significance of private regulation in food 
governance. Here, we inquire into the causes of its emergence and diffusion.  We 
argue that the emergence and diffusion of private food regulation is a function of 
two pivotal characteristics of the global political economy of food. It is a function 
of the structural power of agrifood corporations, specifically retail food 
corporations in our case, providing them with the power to govern.  It is also a 
function of the perceived legitimacy of retail food corporations as political actors, 
which grants them the authority to govern. 
In fact, the aspect of authority is what is particularly noteworthy about the 
emergence and diffusion of private regulation. In a seminal work that sparked the 
debate on private authority, Cutler, Haufler and Porter observed that authority—
“decision-making power over an issue area that is generally regarded as legitimate 
by participants” 44—is not necessarily constrained to the realm of the state. 
Instead, non-state and particularly market actors increasingly exercise authority. 
Such activities include, for instance, the regulation of finance and international 
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accounting, internet and e-commerce governance, environmental governance, 
labor standards, and intellectual property rights.45 
Central to the conceptualization of authority is the notion of legitimacy. 
Following Arendt, authority can be defined as legitimate force.46 Importantly, 
however, authority also works in the absence of force and, in fact, prevents the 
need to use force most of the time due to the normative buy-in caused by the 
perceived legitimacy of a given institution or actor. The aspect of legitimacy, 
then, is the pivotal difference between authority and power. Authoritative rules 
are accepted as such because they are considered “right” on the basis of moral 
convictions (i.e., conviction that it is the right thing to do) and/or custom (i.e., 
because private rule setting has become an understandable and recognized 
practice) and shared beliefs.47 In turn, enforcement of the rules via force is 
considered legitimate as well.  
In the public arena of democratic societies, citizens accept public policies, 
i.e., governmentally decided rules, as legitimate because they participate directly 
or indirectly (through elected representatives) in the making of the rules. Put 
differently, those making the rules have the authority granted by their office, to 
which they have been elected. Moreover, the public can, through courts of law as 
well as elections, hold decision-makers accountable for their decisions. In the 
private sphere, rules lack that quality, however. As the introductory essay of this 
special issue notes, private rules are rarely, if ever, created with participation of 
all of the subjects of regulation, an observation that extends to global food 
governance.48 Accountability is generally lacking as well, while the absence of 
transparency in most cases makes it even harder for the regulated to have some 
control over private regulators.49 Where does private authority originate from, 
then? How are private rules legitimized? In this paper, we adopt a critical 
approach, emphasizing the role of ideational factors, in interplay with material 
structures, facilitating or constraining access to sources of legitimacy, and 
therefore providing legitimate power and creating authority. 
We will discuss the sources of private power to govern and private 
authority to govern below by linking the emergence of private food regulation to 
the material and ideational structures existing in the global political economy of 
food. Specifically, we will show that the power to govern results primarily from 
material structures, while the authority to govern primarily results from ideational 
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structures, although material structures are invested with ideational meaning as 
well, of course. Importantly, power and authority, as well as ideational and 
material bases of private governance, play a complementary rather than 
contradictory role in our analysis. Even though power to govern and authority to 
govern do not always co-exist, they reinforce one another when operating 
simultaneously: Retail rule works because little choice is left to subjects but to 
obey; it remains unchallenged because it is perceived as legitimate.50 
Before we proceed, an observation regarding the relationship between 
public and private food governance is in order. Private food governance has not 
developed completely independently from the activities of public actors. In fact, 
public regulation has greatly facilitated the development of private regulation. In 
certain cases, public actors provide the basis for the creation of private authority 
by holding market actors accountable for any wrongdoing in the supply chain. 
Retail traceability standards, in particular, developed as a result of public 
regulation, specifically the General Food Law of the European Union (EU). More 
specifically, the EU General Food Law explicitly places responsibility on the 
private sector stating that food business operators should have “primary legal 
responsibility for ensuring food safety.”51 This regulation further demands that 
food business operators should “actively participate in implementing food law 
requirements by verifying that such requirements are met.”52 Here, the line 
between public and private food authority becomes somewhat ambiguous. 
In that context, it is noteworthy that by pushing responsibility onto private 
actors, public actors are also hiding from their own. Private authority, however, is 
more than a simple response to public demands. Global retail standards and 
initiatives, for instance, develop despite existing public ones, such as those 
specified by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.53 More specifically, the 
lobbying of private actors has prevented the development of more specific and far 
reaching standards as elements of the Codex Alimentarius.54 Indeed, scholars 
observe the highly politicized nature of standard setting in the Codex with the 
prevalence of economic and political interests in bargaining processes.55 In such 
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cases, then, private authority also serves to constrain public authority from 
developing. 
3.1 Material Structures 
 
The structural power of private actors is traditionally understood as the power to 
constrain policy choices by making alternatives more or less desirable for 
formally empowered decision-makers.56 This form of agenda-setting power 
derives from the ability of private actors, typically transnational corporations, to 
punish and reward countries for their policy choices by relocating investments 
and jobs.57 A more recent development in the structural power of private actors, 
however, is the acquisition of de facto decision-making power, i.e. their ability to 
design, adopt, implement and enforce their own rules in the context of self-
regulation.58 In this article, we are particularly interested in self-regulatory 
activities by retailers as these represent the most prominent new channel for the 
exercise of structural power by private actors.  
We argue that structural power emerges from material structures, i.e., 
structures that foster and prohibit access to and transaction of key material 
resources (most broadly, control access to the market), which enable particular 
private actors, typically transnational corporations, to exercise control over others. 
The dominance of a few corporations in a vast range of market segments fosters 
their ability to limit the choices available to actors, specifically suppliers and 
labor, who desire entry. Control over supply chains enables retail corporations to 
determine who may gain access and on what terms. Material structures, then, 
embody processes of inclusion and exclusion and foster relations of dominance 
and subordination.59 In the context of our analysis, these material structures grant 
agrifood corporations, especially retail food corporations, the power to impose 
their rules and norms on suppliers, from farmers to food processors. Yet, as we 
discuss below, the implications of retail structural power extend to other socio-
economic groups as well. 
Retailers did not always fare prominently in agrifood governance. The 
demise of national and agrarian forms of Keynesianism in the late twentieth 
century fostered a restructuring of supply chains across national borders and 
towards greater concentration, which occurred initially on the supply side of 
agrifood chains.60 As a result, big and powerful food producing and 
manufacturing conglomerates such as ConAgra and Cargill, emerged, particularly 
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in the US. A number of developments in food retailing, however, and the spread 
of globalization—facilitated in part by new food, communications and 
transportation technologies—led to shifts in power towards the end of the supply 
chain, i.e., retailers.61 More specifically, retail capitalism has benefitted from 
capital concentration among food retailers creating large transnational retail 
corporations as well as a widening group of consumers, currently extending 
across the globe. In contrast to food production actors, retailers are less dependent 
upon the natural and organic constraints of agriculture and food. Finally, retailers 
sit strategically between the consumption and the supply side.62 As a result, retail 
corporations emerged as the key drivers in agrifood chains fostering further 
territorial reconfiguration towards greater geographic stretch as well as greater 
concentration in the buyer end of these chains.63 Through global acquisitions and 
mergers, we can currently observe a diminishing number of internationally 
operating supermarket chains (see Table 1) whose market share has constantly 
increased in the last two decades to an extent that regional market structures need 
to be characterized as highly oligopolistic.64 
A number of examples illustrate this argument. In the United States, the 
five largest supermarket chains have almost doubled their market share between 
1997 and 2005, from 24 to 42 percent.65 In the European Union, the top five 
retailers control more than 70 percent of the groceries retail market on average.66 
In individual countries, concentration is even higher. In Finland, for example, the 
top five retailers control 90 percent of the market, while concentration is between 
70 and 80 percent in Sweden, Ireland, Slovenia, Estonia, Austria, Germany and 
France.67 Concentration is also high in developing countries. Reardon, Timmer 
and Berdegue report that in Latin America the top five chains per country control 
65 percent of the supermarket sector.68 
High retail concentration has two key effects. First, the extent of market 
control that the largest food retail corporations currently have in the important 
European and North American markets implies a degree of economic power that 
cannot be ignored. Retailers, in particular, are increasingly able to dictate prices. 
In that context, reports reveal that many supermarkets are selling food products at 
prices manifold the cost of production, without corresponding benefits for 
farmers. In New Zealand, a Green Party survey revealed that supermarkets are  
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Table 1 
Top 30 Grocery Retailers Worldwide, 2006 
Retailer 
Country of 
Origin 
Net Sales in 
2006 (US$ m) 
Grocery retail 
banner sales (%) 
Domestic 
sales (%) 
Foreign 
sales (%) 
Wal-Mart USA 344,992 45.6 78 22 
Carrefour France 97,739 73.9 47 53 
Metro Group Germany 75,131 48.0 45 55 
Tesco UK 78,451 73.3 75 25 
Seven & I Japan 41,600 67.8 66 34 
Ahold Netherlands 56,299 84.4 18 82 
Kroger USA 66,111 70.5 100 0 
Sears USA 53,012 11.8 88 12 
Costco USA 58,963 61.0 80 20 
Target USA 59,490 30.4 100 0 
Rewe Germany 54,515 75.3 68 32 
Casino France 25,752 74.7 58 42 
Schwarz 
Group 
Germany 50,224e 82.6 54 46 
AEON Japan 41,431 55.5 90 10 
Aldi Germany 49,948e 83.5 53 47 
Auchan France 48,408e 62.6 50 50 
Walgreens USA 47,409 36.0 99 1 
Edeka Germany 40,277e 85.4 93 7 
CVS USA 43,814 30.0 100 0 
Safeway USA 40,185 75.4 83 17 
Leclerc France 36,432 61.4 94 6 
ITM France 33,976e 76.9 90 10 
Sainsbury UK 31,360e 75.6 100 0 
Woolworths Australia 31,243e 72.1 89 11 
SuperValu USA 37,406 73.0 100 0 
Tengelmann Germany 29,255e 62.0 58 42 
Coles Group Australia 27,921 54.8 99 1 
Loblaw Canada 25,242 76.7 100 0 
Delhaize 
Group 
Belgium 24,121 77.0 23 77 
Morrisons  UK 22,927 77.9 100 0 
Total Top 30  1,928,618    
Source: Planet Retail 2006b.  Retail banner sales are the sum of the sales of all stores under a retailer's banner.  e indicates 
estimate. 
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pricing fresh fruit and vegetables up to 500 percent higher than the costs of 
production.69 At the same time, apple suppliers are getting the same price they 
were paid twelve years ago: 50 cents a kilo.70 In Europe, while in the late 1950s 
farmers received half the retail price of food, this has now slumped to 7 percent in 
the UK and 18 percent in France.71 UK potato producers, for instance, are 
reportedly paid £44.81 per tonne of standard white potatoes, while shoppers are 
charged an equivalent of £724.25 a tonne.72 In Ireland, while profits from 
supermarket milk have increased by €150 million as a result of double-digit 
percentage rises in food prices in 2007, farmers received less than a third of the 
gains.73 In Norway, studies have documented a dramatic drop in farmers’ selling 
power as a result of increasing retail concentration, as well.74 This list of evidence 
provided by individual reports and studies could be continued. Importantly, there 
are no studies documenting opposing developments. 
Second and more importantly from our perspective, high market 
concentration not only allows retailers to determine prices, but also to impose 
their own standards on suppliers, since retailers are often also in an oligopolistic 
or even monopolistic position vis-à-vis suppliers.  In developing countries, in 
particular, any one food retailer is often the sole purchaser for a given type of 
product.  In other words, market control grants them the power to govern. 
Some supermarket organizations have generated their own quality 
assurance and safety schemes including unannounced inspections at farms, 
gardens and plants. Most commonly however, retailers develop standards 
collectively. GlobalGap, GFSI and BRC, mentioned in the previous section, are 
examples where global retailers jointly develop standards with the aim to regulate 
aspects of food safety, quality and environmental sustainability in the food 
system. With this form of institutionalized cooperation, retailers are able to 
impose demands on producers and producing countries that are difficult to avoid. 
Compliance with these standards by the participating agricultural and food 
companies is certified through independent auditors. Auditing takes place 
normally once a year. If suppliers are found not to comply with the standards, 
they are first issued a warning, in a second step they temporarily lose their license, 
and finally they are excluded from the standard. In addition to conducting regular 
audits, retailers may also select suppliers for special independent audits based on 
risk assessments. “High risk” suppliers are considered those situated in countries 
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with problems, such as poor human rights records (e.g. China) or industries 
specifically targeted by the media (such as the Kenyan horticulture sector).75 
On the basis of their market power and auditing techniques, then, retailers 
are able to exercise control at a distance over supply chains and suppliers, and 
determine what is appropriate and acceptable in terms of prices and quality. 
Worldwide suppliers, in turn, “voluntarily” succumb to demands that grant them 
entry to the desired market controlled by retailers. Other stakeholders are affected 
by the structural power of retailers, as well. Consumers are affected by the ability 
of retail oligopolies to predetermine their choice sets. Thus, the variance on retail 
shelves decreases if a given product is not sufficiently profitable for retailers. On 
the positive side, consumers may benefit from lower prices, increases in quality, 
and some improvements in transparency, although the latter tend to be limited. 
Furthermore, food processors are affected by retail power. As noted above, capital 
concentration in food retailing has led to a shift in power along the supply chain. 
While food processors still hold considerable structural power towards producers, 
they are in a power contest with retailers on the other side. Finally, governments 
are affected by the structural power of retailers in that their own ability to regulate 
may be challenged. Scholars note, for instance, that GlobalGap is in competition 
with public standards in Europe and has prevented national food safety regulation 
from developing.76 
3.2 Ideational Structures 
 
Retailers’ power to govern based on market control would remain fragile and 
potentially ineffective, if it was not paired with legitimacy, however. It is the 
aspect of legitimacy which turns private power into private authority and thereby 
reduces the potential to challenge it. A number of different audiences, including 
the targets of regulation, consumers, governments and intergovernmental 
organizations, and the broader civil society, are relevant for granting authority to 
private rule.77 Even though not all of these audiences are subjects of private 
authority per se (in the sense that they have to comply with private regulation), 
they all experience its existence and/or have to face its consequences. 
Importantly, retail authority is not being granted by retailers’ suppliers 
(the targets of regulation), for the most part. Indeed, legitimacy for these actors 
would derive primarily from “pragmatic sources”,78 such as gaining access to high 
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valued markets and/or getting price premiums for their products. As was shown 
earlier, however, this is frequently not the case. Often suppliers simply have no 
other choice than to adopt a given retail standard. Rather, food retailers derive 
their legitimacy mostly from the perception of consumers and governments in 
developed countries, and an emerging consumer class in developing countries, 
that retailers are doing the right thing and that they are the best actors to do it. 
How do we know that these audiences have, indeed, accepted retail rule as 
legitimate? First, the new food regulatory context with the proliferation of retail 
standards is an indicator of legitimacy. Power may have made the development of 
private rule possible. That the exercise of that rule has not been challenged, 
neither by consumers and nor by governments, however, is a sign of its 
acceptance by these audiences. Simultaneously, retailers have assumed an 
increasingly important role within public regulatory bodies. This is especially 
evident in the EU where retailers, via their umbrella organization Eurocommerce, 
have acquired Board representation within the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA).79 The EFSA is an organization created in the aftermath of the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis with the aim to provide “independent 
scientific advice and clear communication of existing and emerging (food) crises” 
and plays a key role in EU food governance.80 Flynn et al. (2003) also observe 
that the articulation of the principles of traceability and Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCCP) in and through supply chains and as a way of 
regulating these supply chains is very much related to the active retail presence in 
the EFSA. 
Next to their new political role, retailers are also often accepted as 
custodians and guardians of the consumer interest. Indeed, retailers are not merely 
regarded as providers of food any more, but also as “educators”81 helping 
consumers to make their choices and teaching them “how to live the good life.”82 
Here, too, governments play a facilitating role, legitimating private regulators. In 
the realm of sustainable consumption, in particular, the UK government 
underlines its belief that governments and businesses both have the responsibility 
to enable consumers to make sustainable choices.83 In a recent report, the UK 
government also appealed to retailers to help consumers eat a healthy and 
sustainable diet.84 Likewise, the European Commission sees retailers in a strong 
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position to improve the sustainability of consumption and support an agenda to 
empower citizens, as consumers, to make sustainable environmental choices.85 
Some civil society organizations also contribute to the perception of 
retailers as legitimate political actors. In a 2005 statement, for example, the 
Executive Director of the Sierra Club, America’s oldest and largest environmental 
organization, commended Wal-Mart for its efforts to reduce pollution and waste 
and take positive steps towards safer and healthier communities.86 
Other civil society organizations, however, have criticized retail 
environmental and social practices and thus challenged the authority of food 
retailers.87 In a larger perspective, social movements such as the peasant-led Via 
Campesina (originating in the Global South) and elements within food 
localization and the Slow Food movements (originating in the Global North) 
project a very different understanding of food systems emphasizing, among other 
things, food sovereignty and local food sourcing.88 In such alternative 
representations of food systems, the dominance of a few large retail corporations 
is viewed very critically. 
Thus, it is only a small segment of the global population that grants retail 
regulation its authority. It is, however, the crucial segment, as consumers and 
governments particularly in developed countries, in contrast to farmers especially 
in developing countries, are the ones with a choice: a choice to protest, to shop 
elsewhere, or to demand and impose public regulation.89 
Retailers’ legitimacy as rule setters, then, results primarily from the 
dominant ideational structures in developed countries and the political and 
economic elites of developing countries. Ideational structures are structures that 
produce and reproduce ideas with the aim to inform and shape the public (and/or 
political elites’) mind with respect to certain issues. Such structures are numerous 
and can take different forms ranging from cultural norms and values to the media 
or the educational system, for example. The role these ideational structures play in 
establishing and framing legitimacy is an emergent theme in the literature of 
global governance.90 
We argue that the construction of legitimacy via ideational structures 
consists of two dimensions: a constitutive dimension that reflects norms and 
mindsets; and a strategic dimension trying to achieve certain ends by attempting 
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to influence these norms and mindsets.91 Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, 
legitimacy is granted to actors when they are seen as operating within the limits of 
what is considered “appropriate” or “right”.92 In that context, the audience also 
creates the boundaries of actors’ authority, which again emphasizes that authority 
is relational. Legitimacy is also malleable, however. Rather than simply carrying 
out their actions in the context of generally accepted norms and beliefs, actors can 
also try to shape them. A number of business activities can be recognized in that 
area, notably the framing of their own and other actors’ identity, as well as 
attempts to influence general societal norms and ideas.93 Below we identify 
sources of legitimacy relevant both in constituting retail authority and altering it 
strategically. 
First, retail authority is to a large extent based on the dominance of liberal 
and neoliberal norms and ideas. These norms and ideas provide value to certain 
societal objectives over others. Thereby, they also assign roles and evaluations of 
these roles to actors. Specifically, the neoliberal focus on economic growth and 
efficiency together with the assumption that the pursuit of these objectives is the 
most effective way to improve societal well-being provides legitimacy to business 
actors’ interests.94 At the same time, ideas of the benefit of voluntariness and 
achievement-oriented reward systems attribute value to a “small state” and 
discredit political intervention and public bureaucratic management. Proponents 
of these ideas point out that voluntary private institutions can either supplement or 
precede public regulation or even make public regulation unnecessary.95 The 
universality of the success of these claims is evident in the privatization trend, 
which has been taking place across countries and cultures and spreading across 
domains, even politically sensitive ones, such as security, in the last decades.96 
In the context of neoliberal norms, effectiveness appears as the key 
characteristic of retailers’ self-representation. Retail claims of effectiveness and 
efficiency in pursuing social welfare (beyond the provision of jobs and incomes) 
are promoted primarily via corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. CSR 
reporting is based on the idea that, “in order to continue operating successfully, 
corporations must act within the bounds of what society identifies as socially 
acceptable behavior”.97 However, such reporting can also be used to shape ideas 
and create expectations.98 
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Retailers present themselves as effective in protecting food and the 
environment; establish cost-effective farming practices, ensure standard 
effectiveness, effectively address health inequalities, have transparent and 
effective policies, effectively promote sustainability, be effective social partners, 
have effective systems and communicative policies, exercise effective mentorship 
and leadership, and so on. Tesco’s 2009 CSR report mentions, for instance, that 
“managing environmental, social and governance issues is essential to good 
corporate governance, as these impact on reputation and long-term success of the 
business. We have clear, transparent and effective policies and processes for 
managing our business responsibly and in accordance with the law.”99 In addition, 
it emphasizes “We have simple and robust monitoring processes in place to 
ensure our livestock standards are effective.”100 Likewise, Wal-Mart underlines 
the effectiveness of Sustainable Values Networks (SVN), the tool designed to 
implement its program Sustainability 360, in driving and promoting 
sustainability.101 Similar statements are made by all major retailers.  
Simultaneously, retailers attempt to belittle the relevance of public actors 
in that context. Such effort is well reflected in an interview statement by David 
Blackwell, Wal-Mart’s vice president, to Fortune Magazine: “Governments don’t 
make any goods, businesses do. So, it’s going to be companies, not governments, 
that solve these problems.”102 This is a well-known argument made in many other 
business sectors in a similar way, today. In general, the notion that private actors 
do things better is closely tied to discourses about the inefficiency of governments 
and international organizations as global regulators.103 
Second, knowledge is a fundamental source of legitimacy for private 
actors. Possession of expertise or “technical authority”104 allows private actors to 
elicit compliance with their rules because the latter are perceived as having an 
objective quality and political neutrality.105 The increasingly important role of 
epistemic communities, bond rating agencies, and certification bodies, for 
example, can be understood in the context of the creation of technical authority. 
Knowledge and expertise also appear prominently in retailers’ reports. The 
role of nutritional, agriculture, training, and technical expertise in every step of 
the supply chains is highlighted in many CSR reports. Moreover, the provision of 
technical advice to the—“not sufficiently knowledgeable”—public actors, which 
makes them indispensable social partners and allows them to draw on public 
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actors’ traditional legitimacy is also emphasized. Thus, Tesco highlights their 
cooperation with international organizations, such as the Food Standards Agency 
in providing technical advice, Metro with the UN World Summit on Sustainable 
Development 2002 or the ILO, or Kroger with the US Department of Labor.106 
Third, the protection of consumer health and safety are fundamental 
objectives in the global food governance as a result of repeated food crises107 and 
a turn towards more obesogenic diets worldwide. Food is the number one cause of 
premature death in the western world due to the increasing consumption of fattier, 
saltier, and sweeter foods and drinks.108 A “nutrition transition” also affects urban 
populations in developing countries and distinctive national diets through a 
decline in the consumption of traditional foods, increased intakes of fat, sugar, 
salt and often animal foods, an increase in the consumption of processed foods, as 
well as an overall reduction in dietary diversity.109 
The responsibility of retailers towards food safety is emphasized 
throughout their CSR reports and takes place mainly via the establishment of 
HACCP and traceability systems as noted above. According to Carrefour, “Food 
product safety is non-negotiable.”110 For Tesco achieving food safety is of 
“paramount importance.”111 Wal-Mart strives to achieve “higher standards of 
product safety and quality.”112 Regarding broader health concerns, retailers appear 
to encourage healthy lifestyles by describing how they offer the choice of “low fat 
and low calories” products and through the display of nutritional information on 
own-brand products, as well as the pledge to reduce the content of fat, salt and 
sugar in ready meals.113 Healthy eating campaigns, annual nutrition and health 
events at home and in their foreign operations, form an integral part of retailer’s 
performance of their commitment to consumers’ well-being.114 
Fourth, attention to environmental and social concerns is an increasingly 
important aspect of legitimacy in the global domain.115 Environmental and social 
norms are embodied in international treaties, “soft” declaratory international law, 
action programs or statements by leaders.116 The importance of these norms for 
business actors is reflected, for instance, in the growing number of global 
initiatives, standards and public-private partnerships in the sustainability field, 
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such as the Forest Stewardship Council, the Global Compact, and the adoption of 
fair trade and ethical trading initiatives. It also becomes apparent in the recurring 
theme of community and local values. Our Global Neighbourhood, the title of the 
report of the Commission on Global Governance,117 is indicative of the survival 
of these norms and ideas, even in the era of neoliberalism. 
Attention to environmental and social concerns is a central theme of 
retailers’ discursive campaigns. Through advertisements, public relations (PR) 
campaigns, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports retailers present 
their efforts in “greening” business, enhancing the quality of products and being a 
responsible “citizen” on the basis of own brands and standards. Simultaneously, 
however, retailers also attempt to define these issues. A recent analysis of CSR 
reports of the ten biggest global retailers reveals that sustainability, a fundamental 
multi-dimensional concern in global food governance, is limited to eco-efficiency 
and good environmental management, here.118  
The delegation of responsibility to consumers and employees depicted as 
co-participants in efforts towards achieving retailers’ sustainability strategies is an 
issue commonly communicated in CSR reports as well.119 To illustrate this point, 
we offer an example from Wal-Mart. Specifically, Wal-Mart Argentina initiated a 
program titled “Let’s Buy Awareness” in partnership with the ReCrear 
Foundation in 2009, which was advertised as promoting responsible consumer 
habits within local communities. In that program, customers were invited to 
submit their solutions to environmental problems that matter most to their 
neighborhoods, schools and organizations within their communities. According to 
Wal-Mart, more than 5,800 customers and schools submitted their 
recommendations, and several schools received ARS 5,000 ($1,582 USD) in prize 
money for their suggestions.120 In addition, retailers underline their contribution to 
communities by hiring local people, and providing practical support to local 
groups and “good causes.” Such practices also receive prominent news coverage, 
particularly when attracting the attention of politicians and celebrities. Tesco’s 
contribution to urban regeneration in Leeds, for example, was covered extensively 
when Tony Blair visited it.121 
Fifth, scholars have explored other facets of retailers’ sources of 
legitimacy such as those of “charismatic” authority.122 Retailers appear as 
charismatic through the use of symbols and public communications. They present 
                                                 
117
 Commission on Global Governance 1995. 
118
 Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2009. 
119
 Hughes et al 2009. 
120
 Wal-Mart 2009. 
121
 Pal and Medway 2008. 
122
 Dixon 2007, 32. 
24
Submission to Business and Politics
http://www.bepress.com/bap
  
themselves as colorful and innovative actors who also form partnerships with 
other charismatic actors, such as celebrity chefs. 
On the basis of these strategies, retailers attempt to create brand loyalty 
and install trust. Appearing as valuable agents performing fundamental roles for 
society, retailers gain legitimacy as political actors. Retail rules then, become 
authoritative because retailers are viewed as effective, knowledgeable actors with 
health and safety, as well as environmental and social concerns, and charismatic 
personality. 
Of course, retailers are not the only actors with access to ideational 
structures. Especially, in democratic societies it becomes more difficult—though 
not impossible123—to become the dominant voice that shapes and reproduces 
ideas. In comparison to other societal actors such as civil society organizations, 
however, retailers have superior financial resources to buy media time and space. 
Indicatively, Wal-Mart spent $1.4 billion, $1.6 billion, and $1.9 billion in fiscal 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively for advertisement.124 Tesco, spent 1.1 
billion Euros in advertisement in 2006.125 Of course, advertising pursues goals 
besides establishing legitimacy. An increasing share of advertising messages, 
however, carries identity framing messages going beyond the mere description of 
products and prices.126 Moreover, the success and longevity of communicated 
messages depends to a considerable extent on the ability to send repeated 
messages, which is greatly facilitated by the financial resources available to 
retailers. 
To sum up, on the basis of the material and ideational structures 
characterizing the current global political economy of food, retailers can impose 
rules and reach and shape sources of legitimacy. As a consequence, the power to 
govern is supplemented by the authority to govern, which makes retail 
governance much less likely to be challenged on the basis of legitimacy concerns. 
The privileged position in material structures allows retailers to create and enforce 
rules. Access to ideational structures allows them to influence norms and ideas, 
and frame their own and other actors’ identities, facilitating consent on their rule 
and rules. Together these processes serve to create, maintain and reproduce retail 
power and authority in global food governance. 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the consequences of private regulation in global food 
governance and the causes and facilitating conditions of its emergence. Global 
                                                 
123
 See, e.g., Chomsky 1997. 
124
 Wal-Mart 2007. 
125
 Tesco 2007. 
126
 Keller and Lehmann 2006. 
25
Fuchs and Kalfagianni: The Causes and Consequences of Private Food Governance
  
retail food governance has greatly expanded its reach in the past decades, taking 
primarily the form of private standards and initiatives developed individually or 
collectively by leading retailers. The impact of such private institutions on the 
sustainability of the food system is currently ambiguous, at best, which underlines 
the necessity of an inquiry into the conditions of its emergence and legitimacy. 
In terms of the consequence of private food governance, we found little 
evidence of a significantly positive impact on the well-being of the food system. 
Currently, most retail environmental initiatives are selected best practices that 
coexist with regular operations. Rather than changing environmental behavior 
fundamentally, retailers simply add selected programs. Moreover, such programs 
are too few and have too little coverage to make an impact. We identified 
considerable potential in energy initiatives, but it is too soon to offer an evaluation 
of the adoption of such initiatives. In terms of food security, the consequences are 
more ambiguous. While some positive impacts can be identified, in particular 
improved food safety, several concerns remain. More specifically, benefits tend to 
accrue to a small group of the global population only. In addition, retail standards 
have negative consequences, particularly for farmers and small retail shops. 
Vulnerable and marginalized rural populations are the most severely affected 
groups from the emergence of private retail authority. 
Prompted by these rather serious implications of private food governance, 
the paper then inquired into the sources of retail authority. Rooted in critical 
theory, it argued that retail authority can be understood to have been enabled by 
two distinct but reinforcing mechanisms. Through strategic positions in material 
structures, retailers have been able to impose their rules and standards on global 
supply chains and demand compliance from suppliers worldwide. Through access 
to ideational structures, retailers have been in a position acquire legitimacy as rule 
setters and to strategically present themselves and their institutions as superior 
“regulators” in global food governance compared to public actors. 
What conclusions can we draw about private authority from this analysis? 
From a scientific perspective, this paper invites analyses that critically inquire into 
the mechanisms of authority creation. Here, we have suggested the particular 
value of examining the interaction and synergies between ideational and material 
structures in a given area of governance. From a political point of view, the paper 
reveals not only that private food authority is on the rise, with a proliferation of 
private standards and initiatives in crucial areas of food governance, but also that 
this development has problematic social consequences. Consequently, our 
analysis highlights both the possibility of challenging the authority of private 
regulation in food retailing and the need for additional public governance efforts. 
Furthermore, as private regulation has also been on the increase in other policy 
fields, our analysis suggests the need for similar critical inquiries in those fields. 
Normatively, our results suggest that governmental efforts should pay particular 
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attention to those sector, where the poor and marginal groups of society are 
negatively affected by the operation of private authority. 
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